Michael :donor:
Michael :donor:  ·  4 months ago
Here's an unprompted reminder that the tragedy of the commons is a heavily flawed and simplistic theory that is not generally applicable. It was mainly propagated by neoliberals to make people believe that self-governed resources are inevitably tragic (they are not), and to offer the privatization of the commons as a solution to the problem (it is not). The works of Elinor Ostrom make a good case against it.

Also, it was developed by Garret Hardin, a eugenicist and ecofascist, who was scared of overpopulation, and who used it to advocate for forcible population control for people of color.

( @joschi this is not a criticism of you or your post, it just triggered me to point out a common misconception)

@pluralistic

#sociology #economics #neoliberalism

Quote from "Governing the Commons" by Elinor Ostrom. What makes these models [free-rider problems] so dangerous - when they are used metaphorically as the foundation for policy - is that the constraints that are assumed to be fixed for the purpose of analysis are taken on faith as being fixed in empirical settings, unless external authorities change them. The prisoners in the famous dilemma cannot change the constraints imposed on them by the district attorney; they are in jail. Not all users of natural resources are similarly incapable of changing their constraints. As long as individuals are viewed as prisoners, policy prescriptions will address this metaphor. I would rather address the question of how to enhance the capabilities of those involved to change the constraining rules of the game to lead to outcomes other than remorseless tragedies.
Quote from "Governing the Commons" by Elinor Ostrom. What makes these models [free-rider problems] so dangerous - when they are used metaphorically as the foundation for policy - is that the constraints that are assumed to be fixed for the purpose of analysis are taken on faith as being fixed in empirical settings, unless external authorities change them. The prisoners in the famous dilemma cannot change the constraints imposed on them by the district attorney; they are in jail. Not all users of natural resources are similarly incapable of changing their constraints. As long as individuals are viewed as prisoners, policy prescriptions will address this metaphor. I would rather address the question of how to enhance the capabilities of those involved to change the constraining rules of the game to lead to outcomes other than remorseless tragedies.
Quote from "Governing the Commons" by Elinor Ostrom. What makes these models [free-rider problems] so dangerous - when they are used metaphorically as the foundation for policy - is that the constraints that are assumed to be fixed for the purpose of analysis are taken on faith as being fixed in empirical settings, unless external authorities change them. The prisoners in the famous dilemma cannot change the constraints imposed on them by the district attorney; they are in jail. Not all users of natural resources are similarly incapable of changing their constraints. As long as individuals are viewed as prisoners, policy prescriptions will address this metaphor. I would rather address the question of how to enhance the capabilities of those involved to change the constraining rules of the game to lead to outcomes other than remorseless tragedies.
Quote from "Governing the Commons" by Elinor Ostrom. By referring to natural settings as "tragedies of the commons," "collective-action problems," "prisoner's dilemmas," "open-access resources," or even "common-property resources," the observer frequently wishes to invoke an image of helpless individuals caught in an inexorable process of destroying their own resources.
Quote from "Governing the Commons" by Elinor Ostrom. By referring to natural settings as "tragedies of the commons," "collective-action problems," "prisoner's dilemmas," "open-access resources," or even "common-property resources," the observer frequently wishes to invoke an image of helpless individuals caught in an inexorable process of destroying their own resources.
Quote from "Governing the Commons" by Elinor Ostrom. By referring to natural settings as "tragedies of the commons," "collective-action problems," "prisoner's dilemmas," "open-access resources," or even "common-property resources," the observer frequently wishes to invoke an image of helpless individuals caught in an inexorable process of destroying their own resources.
Quote from "Governing the Commons" by Elinor Ostrom. Instead of being wrong, these are special models [Tragedy of the commons, Prisoner's dilemma game, Mancur Olson's logic of collective action] that utilize extreme assumptions rather than general theories. These models can successfully predict strategies and outcomes in fixed situations approximating the initial conditions of the models, but they cannot predict outcomes outside that range. They are useful for predicting behavior in large-scale CPRs in which no one communicates, everyone acts independently, no attention is paid to the effects of one's actions, and the costs of trying to change the structure of the situation are high. They are far less useful for characterizing the behavior of appropriators in the smaller-scale CPRs that are the focus of this inquiry...
Quote from "Governing the Commons" by Elinor Ostrom. Instead of being wrong, these are special models [Tragedy of the commons, Prisoner's dilemma game, Mancur Olson's logic of collective action] that utilize extreme assumptions rather than general theories. These models can successfully predict strategies and outcomes in fixed situations approximating the initial conditions of the models, but they cannot predict outcomes outside that range. They are useful for predicting behavior in large-scale CPRs in which no one communicates, everyone acts independently, no attention is paid to the effects of one's actions, and the costs of trying to change the structure of the situation are high. They are far less useful for characterizing the behavior of appropriators in the smaller-scale CPRs that are the focus of this inquiry...
Quote from "Governing the Commons" by Elinor Ostrom. Instead of being wrong, these are special models [Tragedy of the commons, Prisoner's dilemma game, Mancur Olson's logic of collective action] that utilize extreme assumptions rather than general theories. These models can successfully predict strategies and outcomes in fixed situations approximating the initial conditions of the models, but they cannot predict outcomes outside that range. They are useful for predicting behavior in large-scale CPRs in which no one communicates, everyone acts independently, no attention is paid to the effects of one's actions, and the costs of trying to change the structure of the situation are high. They are far less useful for characterizing the behavior of appropriators in the smaller-scale CPRs that are the focus of this inquiry...